On Chamberlinian-Ricardian trade patterns with many industries by Kikuchi  Toru & Zeng  Dao-Zhi
On Chamberlinian-Ricardian trade patterns with
many industries
著者 Kikuchi  Toru, Zeng  Dao-Zhi
journal or
publication title
Economics Bulletin
volume 6
number 22
page range 1-9
year 2004
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10097/51629
On Chamberlinian−Ricardian trade patterns with many
industries 
Toru Kikuchi Dao−Zhi Zeng
Kobe University Kagawa University
Abstract
This note explores the determinants of trade patterns by extending a
Chamberlinian−Ricardian monopolistic competition trade model to have a larger number of
industries as did Dornbush, Fischer and Samuelson (1977). It will be shown that the degree
of cross−country technical differences among industries plays an important role as a
determinant of trade within each industry.
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1 Introduction
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models of trade have been exten-
sively studied since the seminal work of Krugman (1979). Those models are
very successful to explain the emergence of intra-industry trade (i.e., two-
way trade of diﬀerentiated products) and the industrial agglomeration. To
focus on the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition, a standard
model assumes the cross-country technical homogeneity: each ﬁrm in the
monopolistically competitive sector incurs an identical ﬁxed cost (α) and a
constant marginal cost (β). As a result, there has been little investigation of
the role of technical heterogeneity among countries. However, the Ricardian
comparative advantage, which plays a basic role in traditional international-
trade context, is worthy of more attention. To address this point, Kikuchi
(2004) explored cross-country technical heterogeneity in both ﬁxed costs and
marginal costs as a determinant of trade patterns. Within a two-country,
one-industry framework, he showed that manufacturing sector is agglomer-
ated in a country and the intra-industry trade is very unlikely in a trading
equilibrium.
The present note takes Kikuchi (2004) as its point of departure, and
extends his analysis to include a large number of industries as did Dorn-
bush, Fischer and Samuelson (1977). In each industry, both ﬁxed costs and
marginal costs can diﬀer between the countries. It will be shown that the
equilibrium specialization pattern is determined by the technology index. It
will also be shown that trade patterns, particularly the emergence of intra-
industry trade, are crucially dependent on the shape of the technology index
schedule, which is taken from Dornbush, Fischer and Samuelson (1977). That
is, if technical standardization occurs and the share of similar industries be-
comes larger between countries, the possibility of intra-industry trade rises.
This study is closely related to Venables (1999), which explores the divi-
sion of industries between countries in a multi-industry framework. However,
he uses a framework in which there are both transport costs and linkages
through intermediate inputs. In contrast, in this study we assume away such
aspects and focus on the interaction between cross-country technological dif-
ferences and trade patterns.
The next section develops a Chamberlinian-Ricardian model with many
industries. Section 3 deals with the determinants of trade patterns. Section
4 discusses some implications of the analysis.
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2 The Model
Suppose that there are two countries in the world, Home and Foreign. Home
(Foreign) is endowed with L (L˜) units of labor and the only source of income
is the wage, w (w˜). We assume that there are M manufacturing industries.1
Industry speciﬁc variables will be indexed by industry label i. Consumers
have Cobb-Douglas preferences and purchase equal values of the output of
all industries.
Each industry is modelled as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistically com-
petitive industry. The quantity index of industry i takes the form
X i =
( ni∑
k=1
(dik)
θ +
n˜i∑
k˜=1
(di
k˜
)θ
) 1
θ
, 0 < θ < 1, (1)
where ni (n˜i) is the number of products produced in industry i in Home
(Foreign), dik (d
i
k˜
) is the quantity of product k (k˜) in Home market, and
1/(1− θ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between every pair of products.
The price index of industry i can be obtained as:
P i =
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, (2)
where pik (p
i
k˜
) is the price of the k (k˜)-th diﬀerentiated product produced in
industry i in Home (Foreign). Note that the total revenue in Home is wL,
which will be equally expended in each industry due to the assumption of the
Cobb-Douglas preferences. Solving consumers’ maximization problem yields
the following demand functions for Home consumers:
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1Although it is easier to set the model up with a finite number of manufacturing
industries, we will later think of there being a continuum of them.
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Assuming that the products are transported free between countries, then the
prices of each product in two countries are equal. Therefore, the demand
functions for Foreign consumers are
d˜ik =
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and
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respectively.
Diﬀerentiated products are supplied by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms.
There is cross-country technical heterogeneity: each Home (Foreign) ﬁrm in
industry i has both αi (α˜i) units of labor as a ﬁxed input and βi (β˜i) units
of labor as a variable input. With the number of ﬁrms being very large, the
elasticity of demand for each product becomes 1/(1−θ). Thus, each product
is priced at a markup over marginal cost:
pik =
βiw
θ
, pi
k˜
=
β˜iw˜
θ
.
Using these pricing equations, the summation in equation (3) takes the form
ni∑
k=1
(pik)
θ
θ−1 +
n˜i∑
k˜=1
(pi
k˜
)
θ
θ−1 = ni
(
βiw
θ
) θ
θ−1
+ n˜i
(
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θ
) θ
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.
Substituting this into the demand function yields the proﬁt function of each
Home ﬁrm2
πi =(pi − βiw)x− αiw
=
1− θ
θ
βiw(dik + d˜
i
k)− αiw
2Hereafter, the subscript k is often dropped for simplicity.
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=(1− θ)
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Similarly, the proﬁt function of each Foreign ﬁrm is
π˜i =
(1− θ)
(
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θ
) θ
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) θ
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Now turn to the specialization pattern of industry i. In the trading
equilibrium with zero transport costs, we need non-positive proﬁts in industry
i in each country, with proﬁts being equal to zero if production takes place.
Thus, by setting proﬁts equal to zero for both countries (πi = π˜i = 0),
we would like to test whether the co-existence of both countries’ ﬁrms is
consistent with equilibrium.
First, let us draw attention to the condition that, if both countries’ ﬁrms
in industry i co-exist, proﬁts must be identical for each country’s ﬁrms, i.e.,
πi = π˜i. (7)
This is the condition that must be satisﬁed if πi = π˜i = 0 is to hold. Substi-
tuting (5) and (6) into (7), we obtain
wL+ w˜L˜
M
(1− θ) θ θ1−θ
ni
(
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θ
) θ
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+ n˜i
(
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θ
) θ
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=
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. (8)
Inserting the RHS of (8) into the proﬁt function yields
πi =
(βiw)
θ
θ−1 (αiw − α˜iw˜)
(βiw)
θ
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− αiw,
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It is important to note that proﬁts are independent of both the total number
of ﬁrms and market size.
Before turning to the case of co-existence, note that the equilibrium num-
ber of ﬁrms for the case in which only one country’s ﬁrms exist is
niT{n˜i=0} =
(1− θ)(wL+ w˜L˜)
Mαiw
,
n˜iT{ni=0} =
(1− θ)(wL+ w˜L˜)
Mα˜iw˜
,
where T denotes a trading equilibrium value.
Using these results, one can obtain the necessary condition for the co-
existence of ﬁrms. Let us deﬁne a technology index for industry i:
Ai ≡
(
α˜i
αi
)1−θ(
β˜i
βi
)θ
. (9)
In the free-trade equilibrium the proﬁt must be zero: πi = π˜i = 0. Simple
calculations show that the equations are satisﬁed only if the technology index,
Ai, is equal to the relative wage rate ω ≡ w/w˜.
Proposition 1 If Ai > (<) ω, only Home (Foreign) ﬁrms produce the dif-
ferentiated products in industry i. Intra-industry trade in industry i (i.e., the
co-existence of both countries’ ﬁrms) occurs only if Ai = ω.
[Proof] Suppose that Ai > ω. In this case, both countries’ ﬁrms cannot co-
exist. To see that the case where only Home ﬁrms are active is an equilibrium,
note that
π˜i{ni=niT , n˜i=0} =
(
βiw
β˜iw˜
) θ
1−θ
αiw − α˜iw˜ = α˜iw˜
[(
ω
Ai
) 1
1−θ
− 1
]
.
This becomes negative if Ai > ω since θ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, Foreign ﬁrms
have no incentive to enter given that niT Home ﬁrms are active. On the other
hand, the case in which only Foreign ﬁrms are active cannot support a free
trading equilibrium. This is because that
πi{ni=0, n˜i=n˜iT } =
(
β˜iw˜
βiw
) θ
1−θ
α˜iw˜ − αiw = αiw
[(
Ai
ω
) 1
1−θ
− 1
]
is positive, and hence, Home ﬁrms have an incentive to enter the world
market. Therefore, only Home ﬁrms produce the diﬀerentiated products in
industry i in the free trade equilibrium. The case of Ai < ω can be proven
analogously. [Q.E.D.]
5
3 Trade Patterns
To obtain the world trading equilibrium, we index industries in order of
diminishing Home comparative advantage.3
dAi
di
≤ 0,
whereAi is deﬁned in (9). This schedule is drawn in Figure 1 as the downward
sloping locus AA. Now assume that there is ﬂat segment in the AA sched-
ule: a partition of industries (from m to m¯) is assumed to have equal level of
technology index. We can interpret this as, even ﬁrms in each industry pro-
duce diﬀerentiated products, production technologies of these industries have
become standardized due to increased information ﬂow between industries.
ω
i
A
A
BB′
O
possibility of
intraindustry
trade
mm m¯
Figure 1: Intraindustry trade
Let m denote hypothetical dividing line between Home- and Foreign-
produced commodities, equilibrium in the market for Home products requires
3See footnote 1.
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that Home labor income wL equals world spending on Home-produced prod-
ucts:
wL =
m
M
(wL + w˜L˜).
This schedule is drawn in Figure 1 as the upward sloping locus OB and is
obtained by rewriting the equation in the form:
ω =
m
M −m
L˜
L
.
The equilibrium relative wage is obtained as the intersection of schedules
AA and OB. Now assume that the intersection is obtained at the ﬂat segment
in the AA schedule. Thus, the following condition holds.
ω = Ai, m ≤ i ≤ m¯.
In this case, from Proposition 1, ﬁrms within these industries can be located
in both countries. Therefore, intra-industry trade within these industries will
occur.
Proposition 2 Given that there is a ﬂat segment in the AA schedule and the
OB schedule cuts that segment, intra-industry trade occurs between countries.
Using Figure 1, let us examine the eﬀect of an increase in the relative
size of Foreign. An increase in L˜/L shifts schedule OB upward. If the new
intersection occurs in the ﬂat segment of AA, this shift only changes the
portion of intra-industry trade and the relative wage remains unchanged.
If the upward shift is suﬃciently large and the new intersection occurs in
the downward-sloping segment of AA, no intra-industry trade occurs in the
trading equilibrium and the Home relative wage rises. Our model suggests
that the share of intra-industry trade is smaller between countries that are
dissimilar in size. This ﬁnding is consistent with empirical work by Helpman
(1987).
4 Discussion
Several remarks are in order. First, we should note that these results are
crucially dependent on the assumption of monopolistically competitive in-
dustries. If ﬁrms in each industry produce homogeneous products as in
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Dornbush, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977), there are few incentives of intra-
industry trade between countries. In our model, intra-industry trade oc-
curs since each ﬁrm produces diﬀerentiated products and those ﬁrms are
distributed between countries.
Second, intra-industry trade emerges as a result of the equalization of
the relative wage rate and the technology index, which is also supported by
the existence of the ﬂat segment of the AA schedule. If there is only one
monopolistically competitive industry in the economy, intra-industry trade
is obtained as a result of identical technologies between countries and wage
rate equalization.4 In our multi-industry model, however, wage rates need
not be equalized to obtain intra-industry trade.
Krugman (1979, p. 479) argues that trade need not be a result of cross-
country diﬀerences in technology. We would like to emphasize that the degree
of cross-country technical diﬀerences among industries plays a more impor-
tant role as a determinant of trade within each industry.
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